Iraq As South Korea

When it comes to Iraq it does not seem like the Bush White House will ever get tired of coming up with all sorts of ideas. But the sad thing about that is that none of those ideas has been effective in any sense of the word when it comes to achieving what can be called transparent success. A military undertaking that was started to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, WMD has steadily morphed into an occupation without end in an environment, which remains exceptionally hostile to the US.

The report today in The New York Times that the Bush White House has started to openly fly the kite for an indefinite US military presence in Iraq cannot surprise anyone at all. After all while Mr. Donald Rumsfeld was Defense Secretary there were several reports that the US was briskly building several permanent military bases in Iraq. The more interesting aspect of this kite is that US occupation of Iraq is being discussed in the context of US military presence in South Korea after the Korean war, and of course in Japan and Germany after World War II. Those who are doing this comparison cannot be ignorant of the stark differences between the situation of things in South Korea, Japan, and Germany and Iraq and the Middle East. For one, at no time was the credibility of the US and its values as a super power at odds with the Koreans, Japanese, and Germans as is the case today in Iraq and the Middle East. The closest comparison to the evident realities that obtain in Iraq as regards the desire by the Bush White House to maintain an indefinite military presence in Iraq is Lebanon at the time when former President Ronald Reagan sent the Marines there in the 1980s. There’s no need recounting how that mission tuned into a failed misadventure. But it’s worthy to mention albeit very briefly why it did: the US lacked the bona fide necessary for accomplishing such a mission in that region. Today, the credibility of the US in the region has deteriorated even more than what was the case in the 1980s.

Like the invasion of Iraq proper, indefinite US military presence in Iraq will be an endeavor that will not succeed beyond its implementation. So far, the only successful US endeavor in Iraq is the invasion itself, for the reason that it enabled de facto US military presence there. But a comprehensive balance sheet on Iraq will starkly show that everything else has been a woeful failure. It is one thing if the desire is to maintain an indefinite US military presence and call it a success in and by itself. It will be yet another thing to presume that such an undertaking will mirror US military presence in South Korea, Japan, and Germany. The cost of an indefinite US presence in Iraq will surpass the ordinary. It may not worth much at all. US policy makers must spend more time thinking about what they can do to repair the serious damage that the invasion of Iraq has done to its over all credibility in the Middle East, and less on fantastic desires that will further damage its already damaged credibility in the region. At this time the incendiary kite of an indefinite military presence in Iraq is one such damaging idea.