The apparent calm that seems to herald the prompt arrest and deportation of former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif upon his return from forced exile yesterday sequel to his overthrow in a military coup in 1999 by current dictator, General Pervez Musharraf might not last. There is hardly any doubt that his deportation took not only his party and supporters but also even himself by surprise. The fact that he was served papers for money laundry charges prior to being deported is indication that even the dictator and his regime may have improvised the deportation to Saudi Arabia as a last ditch measure. In which case, they were unprepared for how best to respond to the challenge that Mr. Sharif represents for them in Pakistan.
There are certainly some elements in the regime who favor the option of tackling the challenge evident in Mr. Sharif judicially. Whoever those elements might be, Mr. Sharif’s deportation may indicate that there are also another set of elements in the regime who are uncomfortable with the Pakistani judiciary, which has recently signaled with the restoration of Chief Justice who Musharraf tried to remove, and the ruling that Sharif was free to return to Pakistan, that it is unwilling to side with Musharraf and his regime.
Mr. Sharif’s deportation will further complicate the situation for Musharraf and his regime. They have clearly shown their disregard for the Supreme Court and the rule of law. By so-doing, they are likely to incite negative reactions from parts of the West, particularly the EU, which promptly condemned them for deporting Sharif in disregard of the Supreme Court ruling. Although Musharraf and his regime can resolve to become more aggressive and repressive in their quest to remain in power, there is every doubt that they are capable of stemming the anger of sections of the Pakistani society that show aversion for their continued stay in power. Gone are the days when Musharraf slept peacefully at night. Henceforth, with his regime, he will leap from crisis to crisis all the way, to the point that he may not even have the time and the peace of mind to devout the necessary attention to the task of aiding the US in its global war on terrorism in Pakistan and the sub-region.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Friday, September 7, 2007
The Hand Writing On the Wall
It’s interesting that the Bush White House has refused to see that the hand writing on the wall over its myopic foreign policy gamble in Pakistan clearly indicates a big failure. The pattern of the unfolding events since dictator Pervez Musharraf’s over-reach to get rid of the Chief Justice failed could not have been less clearer: the spontaneous mobilization of various strata of the Pakistani civil society led by the legal profession produced a groundswell that not only succeeded in reversing the dictator’s over-reach, but also emboldened the Supreme Court to void his extra-legal exile of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sequel to his overthrow of his elected government in a coup eight years ago.
This clear pattern of events ought to have been sufficient cause for the US to appraise the situation of affairs in Pakistan more objectively. Such appraisal could have been sufficient pointer to imbue credence to the fact that Musharraf’s regime had slipped into that slippery slid of difficulty that often characterizes a declining dictatorship. Instead, the White House has preferred to embark on a gamble, which is using former Prime Minister Benizar Bhutto to broker a deal that could presumably save Musharraf and his regime. Well, it does not seems as that gamble is about to pay off at all. The court boycott that began yesterday across Pakistan in a renewed campaign by the legal profession to force Musharraf from power is yet another clear indication that the Pakistani civil society, led by the lawyers clearly has the upper hand in the unfolding power situation. In fact, the US gamble may have neutralized Bhutto’s perceived potential to remain relevant in the unfolding power situation.
There is no doubt now that Sharif will return to Pakistan. There is also no doubt that he might probably lead his party, the Pakistan Muslim League in a spirited mobilization to make life difficult if not impossible for any contraption of a government that may result from the US-Musharraf-Bhutto gamble. IkengaComments predicts that most if not all actions taken by Musharraf and his regime to gain the upper hand in the unfolding power situation in the country henceforth runs the risk of back-firing on the dictator. If the ultimate aim of US foreign policy in Pakistan is anything beyond perpetuating an intractably unstable status-quo ante, then the White House is headed for yet another foreign policy failure over there. The hand writing on the wall is so clear on that.
This clear pattern of events ought to have been sufficient cause for the US to appraise the situation of affairs in Pakistan more objectively. Such appraisal could have been sufficient pointer to imbue credence to the fact that Musharraf’s regime had slipped into that slippery slid of difficulty that often characterizes a declining dictatorship. Instead, the White House has preferred to embark on a gamble, which is using former Prime Minister Benizar Bhutto to broker a deal that could presumably save Musharraf and his regime. Well, it does not seems as that gamble is about to pay off at all. The court boycott that began yesterday across Pakistan in a renewed campaign by the legal profession to force Musharraf from power is yet another clear indication that the Pakistani civil society, led by the lawyers clearly has the upper hand in the unfolding power situation. In fact, the US gamble may have neutralized Bhutto’s perceived potential to remain relevant in the unfolding power situation.
There is no doubt now that Sharif will return to Pakistan. There is also no doubt that he might probably lead his party, the Pakistan Muslim League in a spirited mobilization to make life difficult if not impossible for any contraption of a government that may result from the US-Musharraf-Bhutto gamble. IkengaComments predicts that most if not all actions taken by Musharraf and his regime to gain the upper hand in the unfolding power situation in the country henceforth runs the risk of back-firing on the dictator. If the ultimate aim of US foreign policy in Pakistan is anything beyond perpetuating an intractably unstable status-quo ante, then the White House is headed for yet another foreign policy failure over there. The hand writing on the wall is so clear on that.
Monday, September 3, 2007
Musharraf, Bhutto, Et Al
The power situation that Pakistan’s dictator, Parvez Musharraf unknowingly provoked when he over-reached himself in the spring this year and fired the Chief Justice is not likely to resolve itself any time soon. Instead, it is more likely to sustain itself in a truly Pakistani pattern as it spirals itself indefinitely aided by events even as it claims some unsuspecting victims including the dictator himself and even his regime. Apart from Musharraf and his regime, it seems like former Prime Minister Benizar Bhutto is quickly positioning herself as a possible victim of events that she played little or no role to trigger into place in the first instance.
If that happens, it’s only clear that she must blame her extensive opportunistic tendencies more than anyone or anything else for that outcome. Our suspicion is that she may have pre-occupied herself more with listening to the Bush White House than reading the tea leaves on the events more correctly for herself, as the events unfold. In which case, one can only see her as being too myopic to the degree that makes it difficult for her to discern that US desires in Pakistan and in the sub-region has little or nothing to do with whatever her own desires are for herself, her political party, and Pakistan. If she is unable to realize that US desires to save Musharraf and his tottering regime would not further her own ambition to return to Pakistan and to power in the long run, it might be partly because of the issues in her own past that came together to help force her from power some years back. One such issues relates to the corruption charge that was leveled against her husband who could have spent an extended time in jail if she hadn’t embraced the forced choice of exile. If she hopes that the best way to simultaneously protect her husband and return to power is to lend herself and her party to the US gamble to save Musharraf and his regime, she needs to be told that she might not be that lucky.
She and the Bush White House ought to be aware that the circumstances that got Musharraf and his regime to where they are at the moment in Pakistan’s perilous political landscape were made possible by other actors who are highly unsympathetic to US desires in both Pakistan and the sub-region. They should listen to and not ignore the lawyers who successfully saved the Chief Justice from Musharraf's over-reach. That Musharraf’s over-reach was responsible for triggering the situation that gave vent to the anger in the civil society that subsequently produced the defiance that encouraged the Supreme Court to reinstate the Chief Justice and the ruling that exiled former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif has the right to return to Pakistan as a citizen is insufficient grounds for either the US or Musharraf, talk less of Bhutto to presume that they can successfully cash in and benefit is far from the truth. More than the Islamists, who have allied themselves in the past with Musharraf when they deemed it convenient, it’s the secular elements in the civil society who have the upper hand at the moment in the unfolding power game in Pakistan. They were responsible for mobilizing the agitation that compelled Musharraf to blink. They can and will do that all over again if and when they discern that the ploy to save Musharraf in power is about to be off-loaded on Pakistan by the troika of Musharraf, Bhutto and the US.
Even if Musharraf, Bhutto, and the US succeed in installing the former as president, and Bhutto prime minister in a power-sharing deal predicated on Musharraf’s removal of his general’s uniform, there’s no guarantee that the resultant truce would be durable, to say the least. How will they handle Sherrif, the civil society and a Supreme Court, which has found its constitutional voice and place as an independent player? In its quest to isolate Pakistan’s Islamists, the US will certainly ignore the need to ponder this question. But it is a question that will not go away. At the end of the day, the only guarantee for durable stability in Pakistan is a democratic arrangement, which encompasses the secularists and the civil society and places the military under civilian control in Pakistan. Anything short of that will simply sustain a perilous situation that will someday produce a regime controlled by Islamists.
If that happens, it’s only clear that she must blame her extensive opportunistic tendencies more than anyone or anything else for that outcome. Our suspicion is that she may have pre-occupied herself more with listening to the Bush White House than reading the tea leaves on the events more correctly for herself, as the events unfold. In which case, one can only see her as being too myopic to the degree that makes it difficult for her to discern that US desires in Pakistan and in the sub-region has little or nothing to do with whatever her own desires are for herself, her political party, and Pakistan. If she is unable to realize that US desires to save Musharraf and his tottering regime would not further her own ambition to return to Pakistan and to power in the long run, it might be partly because of the issues in her own past that came together to help force her from power some years back. One such issues relates to the corruption charge that was leveled against her husband who could have spent an extended time in jail if she hadn’t embraced the forced choice of exile. If she hopes that the best way to simultaneously protect her husband and return to power is to lend herself and her party to the US gamble to save Musharraf and his regime, she needs to be told that she might not be that lucky.
She and the Bush White House ought to be aware that the circumstances that got Musharraf and his regime to where they are at the moment in Pakistan’s perilous political landscape were made possible by other actors who are highly unsympathetic to US desires in both Pakistan and the sub-region. They should listen to and not ignore the lawyers who successfully saved the Chief Justice from Musharraf's over-reach. That Musharraf’s over-reach was responsible for triggering the situation that gave vent to the anger in the civil society that subsequently produced the defiance that encouraged the Supreme Court to reinstate the Chief Justice and the ruling that exiled former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif has the right to return to Pakistan as a citizen is insufficient grounds for either the US or Musharraf, talk less of Bhutto to presume that they can successfully cash in and benefit is far from the truth. More than the Islamists, who have allied themselves in the past with Musharraf when they deemed it convenient, it’s the secular elements in the civil society who have the upper hand at the moment in the unfolding power game in Pakistan. They were responsible for mobilizing the agitation that compelled Musharraf to blink. They can and will do that all over again if and when they discern that the ploy to save Musharraf in power is about to be off-loaded on Pakistan by the troika of Musharraf, Bhutto and the US.
Even if Musharraf, Bhutto, and the US succeed in installing the former as president, and Bhutto prime minister in a power-sharing deal predicated on Musharraf’s removal of his general’s uniform, there’s no guarantee that the resultant truce would be durable, to say the least. How will they handle Sherrif, the civil society and a Supreme Court, which has found its constitutional voice and place as an independent player? In its quest to isolate Pakistan’s Islamists, the US will certainly ignore the need to ponder this question. But it is a question that will not go away. At the end of the day, the only guarantee for durable stability in Pakistan is a democratic arrangement, which encompasses the secularists and the civil society and places the military under civilian control in Pakistan. Anything short of that will simply sustain a perilous situation that will someday produce a regime controlled by Islamists.
Sunday, September 2, 2007
No Disregard
When IkengaComments debuted on April 6, my conscious decision from that outset was to devote it completely to those objectives that I spelt out in the first posting. In other words, the other commitment that I made to myself remained silent. That commitment was to completely remove myself from the postings. That commitment influenced my decision to keep my whereabouts off the blog. The commitment might be reviewed in the future. After a period of silence, which began after the last posting on July 10, IkengaComments has returned. We urge the reading audience not to misconstrue the unannounced absence as a disregard.
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