Penny Wise, Pound Foolish

One cannot help but wonder why US foreign policy establishment and the individuals who run it make the decisions that back-fire on US national interests so quickly. Let’s take Pakistan as a case in point here.

It is not out of place to infer that the US may have looked the other way while Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons for the sole reason that a nuclear Pakistan will counter-balance its Indian neighbor, which acquired its own nuclear weapons earlier. Although Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapon while it was under a nominal democratic government, it is not lost on the world that it was indeed the Pakistan military that spear-headed the quest for and its realization, perhaps as a possible chip to white-mail the US to condone its ambition to intervene in governance whenever it pleased the generals. It wasn't long after Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons that the nominal democratic government which was in power at time was ousted by the generals led by Musharraf.

There’s little doubt if at all that since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks gave the US the justification to embark on the current endless War on Terror, the men and women who make and implement the policies that drive the campaign seem quite comfortable with Pakistan’s dictator, General Pervez Musharraf. The US staunchly stands by him on the logic that his ouster might put US interests in the sub-region in jeopardy, especially if his replacement is close to Islamists. Musharraf has been the recipient of a generous $2 billion plus worth of aid each year, most of which by war of reimbursements for what his military spends as US proxy in the War on Terror, fighting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in that neighborhood. But there is no guarantee that Mr. Musharraf is playing straight with the US at all. It wouldn’t be illogical to argue that he may not last a day longer in power if he goes close enough to where Osama Bin Laden and his inner circle might be hiding in the so-called tribal areas of Pakistan.

Musharraf is no fool. He understands the US dilemma, i.e. he is needed by Washington for fear that his ouster might jeopardize US interests. The extensive aid that the US showers him with gets the worst of his autocratic tendencies out of him. He can afford to repress his opponents with the strong conviction that the US will not easily withdraw support from him.

In predominantly Muslim Pakistan, US dilemma over what to do with Musharraf cannot be easily resolved given that the perception in most of the Muslim world is that the current War on Terror is targeting Muslims. It may not be easy at all to nudge Musharraf out of power, and he is not likely to relent in his autocratic tendencies. But he will certainly get to the point when he will run out of options. Things will come full cycle then for the US, because some other autocrat or group of autocrats will assume power in Pakistan at that time. Who knows, they may not be amenable to Washington's overtures. What then would the individuals who call the shots in US foreign policy establishment do?